Regarding the 1999 Constitution’s ban on certain associations’ political activity, the Supreme Court correctly ruled in Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Part 1080) 227, 317-318 that:CONTINUE FULL READING>>>>>
The aforementioned clause effectively eliminates the option of independent candidacy in our elections and gives political parties more prominence and accountability. A candidate cannot run for office without a political party. As a result, the parties are the main means of running for elective office. if just a party canvasses for votes, as specified in section 221 above. A good or bad candidate may increase or decrease the likelihood that his party will win, but ultimately, the party that wins or loses an election is what matters.
I believe that the respondents’ counsel lost sight of the reality that, while candidates may change during an election, the party does not, because they failed to recognize the paramount significance of the political party over the candidate. The phrase “a candidate has won an election in a particular constituency” may be used informally or colloquially, although in fact, and in accordance with section 221 of the Constitution, the election was won by his party.
Following this Supreme Court stance, the later ruling in Faleke v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Part 1543) 61 reaffirmed that a candidate cannot run in an election without a political party and that, in accordance with Section 221 of the Constitution, a candidate’s party is the one that won the election in a given constituency.
A careful reading of the aforementioned rulings, however, clearly demonstrates that the Supreme Court was not interpreting any of the provisions of Sections 131, 137, 177, and 182 of the 1999 Constitution, nor was it taking into account the questions of whether an elected executive office holder could be disqualified from office in order to be removed from it, or if he could lose or resign his position by defecting from the party that supported him in the election. According to Oputa, JSC, the Supreme Court held in Adegoke Motors Limited v. Adesanya & Anor (1989) 5 SC 113 at 166 that judicial authorities are inapplicable to cases that are mutually distinct and unconnected.
Additionally, it was fairly boldly stated that our lawyers now have a tendency to evaluate statements in needless isolation from the specific facts and circumstances of the instances in which they were presented. It should be clear by now, in my opinion, that the facts and circumstances of each case determine the issue that will be decided in that specific instance. Therefore, our Justices’ declarations, whether they be obiter dicta or ratio decidendi, must be closely and irrevocably linked to the case’s circumstances.
It would be out of context to cite those statements without connecting them to the facts that led to them, as it is impossible to know the law pertaining to those facts without knowledge of the facts.
In the case of Oyeneyin v. Akinkugbe (2010) 4 NWLR (Part 1177) 265, 286 E-F, the Supreme Court, as per Adekeye, JSC, adopted a similar judicial stance, ruling that: It is not permitted to cite cases at large. While cases are typically resolved on their own facts or circumstances, the facts of the case must be similar. Citing cases that don’t relate to the unique conclusions in a given case causes serious misunderstandings and, eventually, injustices.
Courts must avoid engaging in the pointless academic exercise of comparing and contrasting unimportant cases in order to advance the evolution of the law.
In any case, the Supreme Court was not asked to rule in the Amaechi and Faleke cases above on whether an elected official who leaves the political party that supported him during the election in which he was elected will also leave his executive office after leaving the party or decampment. Because of this, the Amaechi and Faleke examples are not reliable sources for this kind of assumption.
Examined from a different angle, Sections 131, 137, 177, and 182 of the 1999 Constitution explicitly outline the pre-election criteria that determine whether an individual is eligible to run for office or not. Since Sections 131, 137, 177, and 182 of the 1999 Constitution do not have or anticipate post-election application, they are effectively completely inapplicable following the election.CONTINUE FULL READING>>>>>
